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In this paper we show that hiring a Big 4 auditor results in substantial corporate income tax 
savings, compared to hiring a non-Big 4 auditor. Our results are obtained from an empirical 
model that controls for other factors that may affect companies’ income tax burdens. We use a 
population of larger Belgian firms between 1993 and 2002. The findings suggest that Big 4 
audited firms provide (explicitly or implicitly) additional tax expertise which is transferred to 
their clients and lowers their effective tax rates compared to non-Big 4 audited firms.  
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1 1. Introduction 
In July 2002, the US introduced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a result of recent company 
debacles. One of the features of this act is the mandatory separation of audit and non-audit 
services. Shortly after this date, in August 2002, the Belgian Parliament passed the “Corporate 
Governance law” which has a number of features similar to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Perhaps 
the most important aspect of the Belgian law is a better definition of auditor independence and 
a clear outline of what constitutes violations of independence. These regulations make it now 
impossible for Belgian auditing firms to provide both audit services and (tax) consulting 
services to the same client. 
 
However, our period of analysis is limited to the period prior to the enactment of the law. 
During this period both audit services and (tax) consulting services could be provided to the 
same client. Actually, providing both types of services at the same time was common practice 
in Belgium (Vander Bauwhede and Willekens, 2004). Because audit fees and audit service 
quality are directly monitored by the Belgian institute of auditors, it is difficult for Belgian 
auditors to compete by means of audit fees or audit service quality levels
1. One of the few 
options for Belgian audit firms to compete in the period under investigation is by transferring 
knowledge from audit services to non-audit services, especially tax planning services. 
Because incentives to transfer information between (competing) auditing firms are limited, it 
is more advantageous to contract both audit and tax services from one audit firm. As indicated 
above, this is not allowed anymore. Belgian firms are obliged to report their auditor firm(s), 
but not their tax consultant, in their annual statements. Because of the intertwined nature of 
audit services and tax consulting services and the close link in Belgium between financial 
statements and tax statements in the period of our analysis 1993-2002, the Big 4 auditor 
variable can be regarded as a proxy for receiving explicit or implicit tax consulting services.  
 
The results in this paper suggest that firms with a Big 4 auditor have a lower Effective Tax 
Rate
2 than firms with a non Big 4 auditor. Our interpretation of this result is that firms hiring a 
 
 
1 Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (2004) document the absence of a relationship between auditor size and audit 
service quality. 
2 The effective tax rate proxies for the actual tax burden paid by companies, as the actual tax burden is not widely 
2 Big 4 auditor either implicitly or explicitly had access to better quality tax expertise that 
lowered their Effective Tax Rate compared to other firms. By providing better quality tax 
planning services, embedded in audit services, Big 4 audit firms are able to offset their higher 
audit fees with lower effective tax rates for their clients. 
 
Our analysis uses firm level data that control for a number of firm-level factors, apart from the 
size of the auditor, which may affect the Effective Tax Rate (ETR). While the statutory tax 
rate in the period of our analysis did not change at 40.17%, we find a large heterogeneity 
between firms in terms of the Effective Tax Rate reported
3. Our analysis indicates that while 
statutory tax incentives explain some of the variation in ETRs, a large part of the variation can 
be attributed to other factors, such as the size of a firm, the type of corporate finance used and 
the type of auditor it employs, the latter being the focus of this study. Sector membership also 
turns out to be an important factor in explaining the heterogeneity in ETRs.  
Although the STR did not change in the period we analyze, we do observe yearly increases in 
average ETRs in the 1990s, as discussed in Vandenbussche, Janssen and Crabbé (2004). This 
can be related to changes in statutory tax rates
4 and/or tax bases
5.  
 
Our results indicate that hiring a Big 4 auditor results (on average) for the firms in our sample 
in a 1 to 2 % points decrease in the Effective Tax Rate, depending on the specification of the 
model. Given that the average Effective Tax Rate we observe for the sample as a whole equals 
26% and the average reported earnings before tax are 1,284,632 Euro, the tax savings 
generated by hiring a Big 4 auditor range between about 13,000 and 26,000 Euro on average. 
These results also hold when performing different robustness checks.  
 
Our results can provide the missing link in current research on Belgian audit fees. Willekens 
 
available in Belgian financial statements. 
3 A few other studies have analyzed (European) firm level ETRs using different data sets such as Buijink, 
Janssen and Schols (2002) and  Huizinga and Nicodème (2003). 
4 Belgium recently lowered its STR from 40.17% to 33.9% from the year 2003 onwards. Many other EU 
countries have also lowered their STR. For example the STR of Italy was reduced from 52.20% in 1993 to 
40.25% in 2002. For Denmark the STR decreased from 36% in 1993 to 30% in 2002 (KPMG (2003)).  
5 Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002) find that tax rate-cutting and base-broadening reforms usually go hand in 
hand leaving the effective tax rates fairly stable over time. 
3 and Achmadi (2003) were able, on the basis of a random sample of Belgian firms, to 
determine that the average audit fee in the private client market in 1989 was about 495,000 
Belgian Francs (about 12,276 Euro). They also found that Big 4 audit firm charge higher audit 
fees. On the other hand, Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (2004) find no relationship between 
auditor size and audit service quality. In essence this means that Big 4 audit firms charge an 
audit fee premium, while not delivering a better audit service quality. Our findings indicate 
that audit fee premiums for Big 4 audit firms are justified because Big 4 audit firms provide 
their clients not only with audit services, but also with implicit tax advice
6. This results in 
lower effective tax rates for Big 4 audited firms.  
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next two sections give an overview of 
relevant literature regarding statutory and accounting aspects of Belgian corporate taxation. 
The collection and analysis of the data is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 provides some 
descriptive statistics with section 6 introducing the empirical model, whereas section 7 
provides a discussion of the main results. Section 8 contains some robustness checks, while 
the last section concludes and summarizes the main results. 
 
 
2. Previous Research 
An important line of academic research has focused on the association between auditor 
characteristics (e.g., audit quality
7) and measures of earnings quality or earnings management 
(e.g., Balsam, Krishnan, and Yang, 2003, Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam, 
1998, Krishnan, 2003). This research has often found that higher levels of auditor quality are 
associated with lower levels of earnings management. These studies were all performed on 
listed firms, often in a USA context. Vander Bauwhede and Willekens (2004) who also 
analyze Belgian data find for the private client market that a Big 4 auditor does not provide a 
quality premium and does not affect earnings management compared to non Big 4 auditors. 
They interpret this as the result of a lower demand for high quality auditing services because 
 
6 Audit firms may also provide explicit tax advice, potentially also resulting in lower effective tax rates. Due to 
data considerations we are not able to analyze the impact of explicit tax advice. 
7 Audit quality is often proxied by Big 4 auditor expertise or auditor industry specialization. 
4 of lower levels of information asymmetry between the owners and the managers of a firm. 
Another possible explanation for this finding is the controlled nature of the audit market in 
Belgium. Information on both audit fees and audit service quality levels has to be reported to 
the Belgian institute of auditors. In contrast, similar information on (tax) consulting services 
does not have to be provided. The Big Four
8 auditors are the largest auditing firms, consisting 
of Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PriceWaterhouseCoopers. This research has, 
typically, not investigated the effect on net income of hiring a Big Four auditor, but has rather 
focused on the levels of discretionary accruals (Lennox, 1999). 
Auditors not only provide audit services, but also, in the Belgian context, tax services. Some 
research has investigated tax function activities at firms. Dunbar and Philips (2001) 
investigate why firms outsource tax planning and tax compliance functions. They find that 
such decisions are affected by, among others, transaction costs relating to human-asset 
specificity. They also find that firms with more of a tax-planning focus, outsource greater 
(lesser) proportions of their tax-planning (-compliance) activities (Dunbar and Philips, 2001, 
p. 35).  Mills, Erickson and Maydew (1998) investigate the associations between company 
characteristics and tax related expenditures. Among others, they find that relative tax planning 
costs decrease in firm size.   
To measure actual corporate tax burdens, different measures are available. According to 
Nicodème (2001), the best measure to capture the actual average tax burden on corporate 
income, is the average ETR measure. This measure expresses the corporate income tax 
expense relative to pre-tax financial accounting income and has widely been used in tax 
related research (see, for example, Callihan, 1994 and Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). The 
absolute ETR levels or the differences between ETR levels and statutory tax rates indicate to 
what extent firms are able to reduce taxes payable by means of tax planning/tax compliance 
strategies. The degree in which tax and audit services are interrelated depends on the 




8 Prior to a number of mergers, these firms were also knows as Big Five, Big Six, Big Seven and Big Eight 
auditing firms. All of the previous auditing firms included in this list were coded as a Big 4 auditing firm. 
5 3. Statutory Framework 
In this section we explain the determinants of the statutory tax base and the statutory tax 
incentives that applied in our period of investigation 1993-2002. Also, a number of specific 
aspects relating to the audit profession are mentioned. The corporate income tax system in 
Belgium has a stepwise progressive tax rate system with rates ranging from 28% up to 
40.17%.
9 In Belgium tax statements and financial statements are closely linked. This is a 
result of Belgium being a country using the “continental” model (Roberts, Weetman and 
Gordon, 2002, p. 113). In a “continental” model there is a close relationship between the 
financial statements and the tax statements. While the relationship in Belgium is not one 
where both types of statements are identical, differences between the two types of statements 
are very limited.   This is in contrast to countries using a “business” oriented model, such as 
the USA and the UK (Roberts, Weetman and Gordon, 2002, p. 113). These countries have an 
(almost) complete lack of relationship between the financial statements and tax statements. 
This means that in a “continental” model, such as in Belgium, the reporting of financial 
figures in financial statements has often direct repercussions for the amount of taxes owed to 
the government. This implies that auditors can almost directly influence the taxable income 
when changing financial accounting income. Auditors with additional expertise (e.g., Big 4 
auditors) can therefore provide implicit tax advice to their clients when auditing the financial 
statements. That is, there is a spillover effect from auditing financial statements towards tax 
statements. Because of their expertise, Big 4 auditors should be able to provide more and/or 
higher quality implicit tax advice. 
 
 While we do not observe the true tax base
10 in our data, we do observe the yearly reported 
income/profits by each firm, which is used by the tax authorities to determine the tax base, in 
the following manner. First, from the annual income/profit figures that firms report, the tax 
authority can reject a number of expenses, which are not deemed to be true expenses of the 
period. This would enlarge the tax base. Secondly, firms can get a tax facility for dividends 
 
9 All the firms in our sample have reported income/profits over 89,500 € which makes the highest STR their 
relevant marginal tax rate. Based on the actual income levels and relevant tax brackets, the weighted average 
STR is 39.88%, which is very close to the top marginal tax rate of 40.17% which we will use throughout the text. 
10 The true tax base is generally not reported in Belgian financial statements. 
6 received from affiliated firms to avoid double taxation of dividend income.
11 Thirdly, there is 
a tax facility for losses reported in the past (‘carry-forwards’).
 12 And finally, tax incentives 
are also granted for four types of investments: investments in patents, investments in Research 
& Development, investments in energy-saving technology and other investments
13. The extent 
to which expenses are rejected by the tax authority, as well as some of the statutory or 
negotiated tax incentives a company enjoys can not be observed in our data. However, we do 
know the total ‘tax expenses’ a firm owes to the tax authority. A widely used manner to 
measure ETRs is by relating the firm level ‘income taxes expense’
14 to the ‘reported profits 
before tax’ (Callihan, 1994, Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001, Buijink, Janssen and Schols, 
2002). The extent to which the ETR differs from the STR is indicative of how the tax base 
relates to the reported profits before taxes in our financial statements data. If the ETR is below 
the STR, which on average is the case, the tax base is smaller than the reported earnings and 




We use a rich panel dataset of 12,197 larger Belgian firms
15 over a period of 10 years 
covering 1993-2002. Our final sample contains 95,768 firm-year observations
16. The dataset 
was obtained from the commercial database BELFIRST which contains the financial 
 
11 When dividends come from associated firms, 95% of the dividend revenue is free of Belgian corporate tax. For 
affiliates within the European Union (participation > 25%) a full exemption is granted. 
12 The taxable income may be reduced with losses of previous periods. In Belgium losses can only be deducted 
from future profits, this is called carry-forward of losses (Vankerckhove and Heirewegh (2003)).  
13 For the period we analyse (1993-2002), the tax facility for each of these investments was 13.5% of the cost of 
investment except for other investments with a rate of 3.5% 
14 The “income tax expense” includes both current and deferred income taxes, whereas the “reported profits 
before tax” are the financial accounting income before taxes, both as reported in the income statement. 
15 The firms in this sample represent 21% of Belgian employment. 
16 Based on the sample of 12,197 firms for 10 years, 121,970 firm-year observations were possible. However, 
only 109,347 firm-year observations were actually available. After removal of extreme observations, the panel 
has 95,768 firm-year observations. the 13,579 extreme observations included 10,167 negative ETR observations 
and 3,412 observations with an ETR larger than 1. The 95,769 firm-year observations include 617 firm-year 
observations from listed firms. 
7 statements of all incorporated Belgian firms. We excluded very small firms
17 as these only 
have to provide condensed financial statements, not containing all of the variables required for 
our analysis. We excluded financial institutions like banks and insurance companies, because 
they are subject to different accounting rules and reporting standards. Our analysis is based on 
unconsolidated financial statements
18 and we only consider ETR observations between 0 and 
1 to control for outliers as in Collins and Shackelford (2002). While the BELFIRST dataset 
contains data for the years 1989 to 2002, the availability varies between years. Especially, the 
availability of data for the years 1989-1992 is very limited. Therefore, the focus of our 
analysis is on the period 1993-2002.  
 
 
5. Descriptive Statistics 
The (average) ETR is referred to as a micro backward-looking measure of corporate tax 
pressure (Devereux, Griffith and Klemm, 2002). This variable is our dependent variable in the 
regression analysis in the next section
19. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics (mean, median 
and standard deviation) for the overall ETR and separately for Big 4, non Big 4 audited firms 
and firms with missing data. A first observation is that while the average ETR for large 
Belgian firms is around 26%, the median ETR is higher and lies around 29%. The higher 
value for the median, which captures the middle observation, suggests that the ETR 
distribution is skewed to the left caused by a number of companies with low ETRs. A study 
by Buijink, Janssen and Schols (2002) finds an average ETR for Belgium of 21.64%, but for a 
significantly smaller dataset of only 350 firm-year observations. Their dataset consists of 
observations for the largest Belgian firms only. This might indicate that these very large 
companies are effectively taxed at lower rates than the firms in our data sample. Second, 
 
17 Very small firms are defined according to the European Union fourth company law directive. When a firm 
fulfills at least two of the following three criteria it is a small firm: balance sheet total of less than €3.125 million, 
net turnover of less than €6.25 million and less than 50 employees. 
18 In Belgium there is no fiscal consolidation, hence the unconsolidated accounts are used to determine tax 
expenses. 
19 To the extent that the independent variables are correlated amongst themselves, multicollinearity may be a 
problem. Collinearity diagnostics do not indicate such a problem. Vandenbussche, Janssen and Crabbé (2005) 
provide specific information on the relationship between company characteristics and ETR levels. 
8 although all large Belgian firms are subject to the same statutory tax rate, the standard 
deviations in Table 1 indicate a lot of firm heterogeneity in ETRs. Third, mean and median 
ETRs of Big 4 and non Big 4 audited firms differ clearly, while the mean and median ETR of 
Big 4 audited firms are clearly below the mean and median ETR of non Big 4 audited firms. 
This indicates that Big 4 audited firms have a more right skewed distribution compared to non 
Big 4 audited firms.  
 
Table 1: Average Effective Tax Rates  




















In terms of the auditor data that we have, most firms report the name of the auditing firm that 
. Model and Variable Definitions 
section closely follows the literature (e.g., Huizinga 
it = β0 + β1 FIRM SIZEit + β2 LEGALit +β4 BIG 4it + β5 YEAR +β6 SECTORi + εit  (1) 
 
certified the accounts. In our data about 18.9% of the firms report a Big 4 auditor, while 
71.99% report a non-Big Four auditor. This confirms the finding by De Beelde (1997) that the 
Belgian market structure of the audit market consists of many small auditing firms and a few 




The empirical model we introduce in this 
and Nicodème, 2003 and Buijink, Janssen and Schols, 2000) by including firm characteristics 
and sector dummies to explain firm level ETRs. In addition to the approach used in this line of 
literature we also include year dummies, proxies for statutory tax incentives and a dummy 
capturing the type of auditor used by the firm in a particular year, where we distinguish 
between Big 4 auditors and non-Big 4 auditors. Definitions for the different variables are 
included in appendix Table A2, whereas the correlation matrix is listed in appendix Table A1. 
The empirical specification of the multivariate model we test has the following general form: 
 
ETR
9 where the dependent variable, ETR, is the effective tax rate of firm i in year t, for one of the 
ears between 1993-2002.  
een measured by the log of total assets but this has resulted in 
 intensity (Cap), long term leverage (Ltleverage) and R&D expenses 
 
y
An important firm characteristic variable in previous ETR research has been FIRM SIZE, 
which has predominantly b
ambiguous signs as argued by Gupta and Newberry (1997). For this reason we also proxy firm 
size by the log of total employment at the firm level (EMPLOYM). The correlation between 
both firm size proxies is about 0.65, indicating that both proxies are partially complementary 
to each other
20. 
We also include a set of variables proxying for a number of statutory tax breaks (LEGAL), 
such as capital
(R&Dintens). Specific tax rules allow for additional deductions, as well as for specific 
depreciation rules. The capital intensity of a company is defined as the ratio of fixed tangible 
assets over total assets. This variable can affect ETR through the tax treatment of 
depreciation
21 or through the tax breaks for investments.
22 Long-term leverage is defined as 
the ratio of long-term debt over total assets. One reason for including this variable is that 
interest payments on debt are fully deductible as long as the creditor is a financial company 
institution (Vankerckhove and Heirewegh (2003)). As discussed above, there is also a tax 
facility for R&D investments and patents. This is the main reason for including the 
R&Dintens variable which is defined as the ratio of intangible fixed assets over total assets.
23 
A specific statutory tax break is available for so called coordination centers. A dummy 
variable is included to control for this facility, being 1 when the firm is classified as a 
coordination center.
24  For these statutory tax break variables we expect a negative effect on 
ETR. The variable BIG 4 is a dummy variable with a value of 1 when the firm is audited by 
one of the Big 4 auditing firms in a particular year and a value of 0 if not. 
To analyze the yearly evolution of ETRs over the period we include 9 year dummies (y1994-
20 Due to multicollinearity problems, no interaction variable FIRMSIZE*BIG4 is included in the model. 
21 Depreciation is an expense of the period and lowers the tax base.  
22 For energy saving investments the company can deduct 13.5% of the purchase value of the investment from 
the taxable income (Vankerckhove and Heirewegh (2003)). 
23 We have also experimented with including the AGE of a firm, but this variable never turned out to be 
significant and was therefore dropped from the analysis.  
24 Co-ordination centers are part of a multinational group and engage in financial or business services for this 
group. They have to pay less taxes in Belgium.  
10 y2002) with 1993 as the reference year. Finally, to control for sector heterogeneity we include 
33 sector dummies at the two-digit Nace-Bel level. We also include an error term ( it ε ) to 
control for white noise. In the next section we report the results of an Ordinary Least squares 
(OLS) regression where we take into account that firm observations in consecutive years are 
not independent observations. For this reason we cluster around firm observations using a 




7. Empirical Results 
In this section we discuss our main results. Table 2 reports the main OLS regression results 
vailable observations for the period 1993-2002.  In column (1) we 
ult has also been found in other studies like Gupta and Newberry 
th many interest expenses have lower ETRs, as well as firms that invest in R&D. 
esting that having 
25 Mills and Newberry (2001) specify book-tax income differences as dependent variable instead of ETR. 
Taxable income data are not directly available in our dataset, can, however be estimated by dividing the tax 
ver, running a regression where we delete these observation rather than treating them as zeros, 
 
for model (1), using all a
use the logarithm of total assets as size variable, while column (2) uses the log of employment 
as a proxy for firm size.   
Both firm size variables have a small positive effect on the ETR, indicating that larger firms 
pay higher taxes. This res
(1997) and Zimmerman (1983) for the US. However, the size effect is also dependent on the 
specification of the empirical model as discussed in Vandenbussche, Janssen and Crabbé 
(2004). 
All the ‘LEGAL’ variables come with the expected sign, lowering ETRs. So, highly leveraged 
firms wi
Capital intensive firms have lower ETRs as a result of higher depreciation.  
The results in Table 2 also confirm that co-ordination centers have a lower ETR. The BIG 4 
auditor dummy is negative and significant both in columns (1) and (2), sugg
a BIG 4-auditor ‘pays off’ by lowering the Effective Tax Rate
25 a firm faces, even in a 
multivariate setting controlling for other factors possibly influencing ETRs.
26 However, the 
 
expense by the STR. Usage of this estimated book-tax income difference variable provides similar results as the 
ETR variable. 
26 Some firms do not report their auditor. In our data these observations get a value of 0 for the BIG 4 auditor 
dummy. Howe
11 possibility arises that firms audited by BIG 4 auditors, happen to be foreign owned firms or 
more generally firms that belong to an international group. If that is the case, what we are 
picking up with the Big 4 auditor dummy may just reflect that a firm is more international 
which could result in lower Effective Tax rates for other reasons. To disentangle the two 
effects, in column (3) of Table 2, we include two control variables in addition to the BIG 4-
auditor dummy. One is a foreign ownership dummy (FOWN) that has a value of 1 when at 
least one foreign shareholder has more than or equal to 50% of the shares. The other control 
variable is a dummy with a value of 1, when the Belgian firm has at least 50% of the shares in 
a foreign subsidiary. By including these two variables we want to make sure that the BIG 4-
auditor effect is truly driven by the type of auditor a firm is using and not the fact that it 
belongs to a group. The results in Table 2 suggest that even when including these two 
additional control variables the BIG 4-auditor dummy remains negative and significant in 
column (3), suggesting that it has explanatory value on top of international group 
membership. 
 
Table 2: Regression Results 
s a BIG 4 auditor, = 0 otherwise 
   
(3) 
 
BIG 4 auditor dummy: = 1 if firm ha
Dependent variable  (1)  (2) 
ETR ETR ETR









-  0. 0.0
Ltleverage -0.006*** 
2.76] 
-0.008**  -0.023*** 
[- [-2.15]  [-2.80] 






R&Dintens -0.242***  -0.243***  -0.309*** 
[-7.55]  [-6.39]  [-5.08] 













yields the same negative and significant effect on the BIG 4 auditor dummy. 
12 FOWN total dummy  -  -  -0.024** 
[-2.41] 
FSUBS total dummy  -  -  0.001 
[0.13] 
Listed -  -  - 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 










Observations 25884  24388  3600 
R² 0.045  0.050  0.081 
F-statistic 47.62  .49  24 6.53 
Prob>F 0.000  0.000  0.000 
Note: t-values are between bracke * = significance at 10% level, ** = significa  at 5% level, *** =   
significance at 1% 
Table 3 reports some robustness checks. We start in column (1) by reporting the outcome of a 
gged value of ETR (t-1
explanatory variable on the right hand side to control for possible autocorrelation
27. However, 
our main variable of interest, the BIG 4 auditor dummy remains significant.  In column (2) of 
e report the results  nsored tobit reg n that takes into unt that ETR is 
ted variable.
28
twice the standard deviation of the mean ETR. The results of this regression 
re shown in column (3) of Table 3. Again the results remain qualitatively the same.  
l for carry-forwards of losses which apply under Belgian law, by 
including a variable (LOSS [t-1]) to capture last year’s losses. Although the sign is, as 
27 Inclusion of previous year ETRs for several prior years is not significant in the model. 
ts,  nce
 
8. Robustness Check 
dynamic specification where we include the la ) as an additional 
Table 3 w of a ce ressio  acco
a trunca
Another common way to control for outliers is where we cut-off all ETR observations larger 
or smaller than 
a
In column (4) we contro
expected, negative, this variable is not significant. A possible explanation is that previous 
year’s losses is too rough as a variable, as there is no one to one relationship between losses 
and ETRs. Using Belgian financial statements we are unable to calculate the carry-forward 
 
28 The distribution of ETR1s is shown in Figure A.1 in the Appendix. 
13 positions of firms. Results for other variables in this robustness check are however not 
affected by the inclusion of the LOSS_1 variable. Overall, the robustness checks confirm the 
earlier findings, especially the negative effect of having a Big 4 auditor on ETR, which is 
significant in all examined models. 
 
Table 3: Robustness Checks 





2 st. dev. from  
the mean ETR 
(4) 
ETR 
ETR (t-1)  0.009 
[0.99] 
- -  - 
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Loss (t-1)  -  -  -  -0.244 
[-64.34] 
BIG 4-Auditor   -0.026*** 
[-4.29]  [-7.38]  [-3.73]  [-4.16] 
-0.035***  -0.021***  -0.020*** 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  yes 








0.214** 0.088** 0.186** 0.224**
Observations 24388  24801 23575  24388 
R² 0.050  0.060  0.058  0.209 
F-statistic 23.26  -  27.49 203.33 
Note: t-values between brackets 
*= significance level at 10% nificance l , ***= sign evel at 1% 
9. Conclusion 
In this paper we find that firms that hire a Big4 auditor, have lower Effective tax rates than 
, **= sig evel at 5% ificance l
 
14 other firms. Our evidence is based on a data set of large Belgian firms with over 95,000 
ons for the per  1993-2002. 
We interpret our result of lower ETRs for firms with Big4 auditors, that these  plicitly 
ugh their au is 
the Belgian law did not require a strict separation between auditing and tax services. This 
changed in 2002, where legal reforms were implemented demanding a strict separation 
ting servic d other services provided by auditing firms. Our results seem to 
 the perio fore these  ms, the provi  of auditing and tax services to 
 client was common practice in Belgium.  
 
Correlation ix 
 ETR1  Big  4 
auditor 
ASSETS EMPLOYMENT  LTleverage 
observati iod  
firms im
or explicitly obtained tax advice thro diting firm.  During the period of our analys
between audi es an
suggest that in d be refor sion
the same
Table A.1:   Matr
 
BIG 4  -0.043 1  0.373  0.299 
auditor 
-0.008 









0.017  FSUBS  0.
Cocen -0.001  0.044 0.046  0.044  -0.010 
R&Dintens -0.094 0.040  -0.025  -0.041  0.014 
CAP -0.117  -0.088  -0.071  0.013  0.131 
LTleverage -0.075 -0.008  -0.053  -0.059  1 
EMPLOYM 0.079  0.299  0.743  1  -0.059 
ASSETS -0.003  0.373  1  0.743  -0.053 
 









Cocen -0.037  -0.019  1 
R&Dintens -0.111  1  -0.019 
CAP 1  -0.111  -0.037 
 
15 Table A.2: Data-appendix
por  Income Taxes/ Profit before Taxes 
  
ETR  Cor ate
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SECTORS  33 sec mies a its Nace-Bel (=0 if optical and 
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tor dum t 2- dig
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